The EU–US Trade Deal: A $750 billion commitment caught between supply security and climate strategy

On 27 July 2025, the European Union (EU) announced a trade deal with the United States (US), averting a potential 30% tariff escalation.[1] Failure to conclude negotiations risked a transatlantic economic relationship valued at $2 trillion annually, which is nearly 6% of global trade in goods and services.[2]  In addition to tariffs, there is also agreement on EU purchases of energy products, and to work together on economic security, access to critical energy and investment facilitation.  This blog examines some of the implications of this announcement, reflecting how it could shift the EU's key trade relationships in energy and influence its progress toward achieving climate goals. The terms of the deal The deal sets a 15% base tariff on most EU exports to the US, effectively halving the previously threatened tariff rate. The agreed 15% baseline tariff is understood to be applied on an inclusive basis and not as an additive layer to pre-existing rates. Both sides appear to have agreed on zero-for-zero tariffs for a number of strategic products. This includes all aircraft and component parts, certain chemicals, certain generics, semiconductor equipment, certain agricultural products, natural resources, and critical raw materials. Officials also confirmed that work will continue to [...]

By , |2025-08-12T15:52:38+01:0012 August 2025|Blog, International Trade|0 Comments

Chasing Windmills: Trump’s Brazil tariffs and the Latin American ‘backyard illusion’

On 30 July, President Trump issued an executive order raising tariffs on Brazilian goods by 40%, totalling 50% when added to the 10% baseline announced in April. Invoking emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act (NEA), the justification wasn’t an economic threat, but Brazil’s domestic legal actions, particularly Supreme Court measures against the spread of misinformation in social media platforms and the trial of former president Jair Bolsonaro, accused of undermining Brazilian democracy. This represents economic coercion, violating the principle of non-intervention, which prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, and WTO rules. The blog focuses on how these trade tariffs are a tool to achieve geopolitical goals in the pursuit of hegemonic leadership. The executive order targeting Brazil breaches US obligations in the GATT: Article II:1(b), which binds it to agreed maximum tariff rates, and Article I:1 (most-favoured-nation treatment), which requires equal treatment of all WTO members. It doesn’t meet the requirements of a national security exception under Article XXI as interpreted by WTO jurisprudence. The measure also breaches Article 23 of the DSU, which prohibits unilateral trade retaliation. More than violating such commitments, the US administration is subverting [...]

By |2025-08-01T14:19:54+01:001 August 2025|Blog, UK - Non EU|0 Comments

Trump’s trade deals: It’s not 1931, yet.

  The overall impact of Trump's actions may only represent a modest shock to the rest of the world, primarily because the US budget and trade balances are likely to widen due to the fiscal stance, which will boost US demand relative to output. However, there could be significantly different relative impacts on other countries. Ultimately, the final outcome will depend on whether the rest of the world magnifies or dampens these effects. The spate of recent “trade deals” done by the US does not stabilise the world trade system; rather, it creates ongoing uncertainty. It’s not like 1931 when the Smoot-Hawley tariffs dramatically increased tariffs on all suppliers across the board simultaneously as US aggregate demand was collapsing, sending a huge macro-economic shock across the world. The US was the world’s biggest importer, and other countries worsened the situation by raising protectionist barriers against one another, e.g. the UK Tariff Act of 1932. Even though the new Trump tariffs are nearly as high as those of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the US accounts for only about 15% of world imports. At the same time, Trump is cutting taxes (on the rich) in a manner that is very likely to [...]

By |2025-08-01T13:03:23+01:0030 July 2025|Blog, International Trade, UK- EU|0 Comments

The UK-US ‘geopolitical’ deal: A dangerous precedent for the UK and the world

We are living in a geopolitical world. While states may cloak their actions in legal justifications or economic reasoning, trade has become a tool to assert power, control narratives, and forge alliances. Trade deals are being designed to reduce vulnerabilities, not barriers. The recently announced US-UK deal is not a traditional trade agreement but a ‘geopolitical’ deal strongly reflecting the US’s geopolitical rivalry against China. Lacking the legally binding nature of international agreements, the deal sidesteps legal frameworks and instead stakes its importance on strategic alignment. As such, it signals a broader shift in how the US, which has its global leadership threatened by the rise of China as a superpower, now uses trade policy: not as a matter of market efficiency or legal commitments, but as an instrument of geopolitical influence and national security. Furthermore, the deal clearly shows the second Trump administration’s strong intention to force trade partners to collude with the US to squeeze China from global supply chains. Securitising supply chains At face value, the deal includes a few economic concessions, conditional on fulfilling security-related requirements. For example, the US has agreed to reduce tariffs on British steel, aluminium, and automobiles. In return, the UK will [...]

Stroking a bear to get half a sandwich

The UK and the US announced the first bilateral post-Reciprocal Tariffs deal on 8 May, named the 'U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal' (henceforth the US-UK EPD). The document published yesterday draws out the contours of this EPD, alongside some concrete initial proposals for reciprocal preferential market access for selected goods. Notwithstanding the negotiations starting immediately, this arrangement can be called off at any time, simply by the two parties giving each other written notice. Besides its symbolic and diplomatic relevance, what is the value of this emerging deal for the UK? This is not a Free Trade Agreement. At first glance, it looks like a quid-pro-quo “mini-deal” of limited economic relevance that the US strong-armed the UK into accepting under the threat of tariffs. The UK is getting some respite from Trump’s tariffs in the (important) car and the (strategic) steel and aluminium sectors, in exchange for lowering tariffs on some agricultural products such as ethanol and beef, the latter on a reciprocal basis. But a closer reading of the ‘General Terms document’ suggests that it is more than this, and a lot worse. First, as stated on page 1 of the text, the arrangement that the US and the UK [...]

Bridge over the River Kwai or Road to Nowhere?

It is not often that there’s a genuinely new idea around in trade policy, but lo and behold, here’s one: a tariff on a service.  US President Trump is considering a 100% charge on films made abroad. Spielberg would call it a close encounter of the third kind. Although the charge would apply in principle to any foreign-made film, it could hit the UK film sector, part of its successful creative industries, particularly hard, turning it into the English Patient if the idea gained traction. But how could it even work? Since services are intangible and non-storable, suppliers and consumers of services somehow need to come together for a service to ‘change hands.’  Internationally, this can happen in a variety of ways. For instance, the service may be delivered digitally via the Internet, as indeed it would be the case for a movie or an architectural blueprint.  The consumer could travel abroad to enjoy a service (e.g. tourism), or firms could set up affiliates abroad to sell their services to local consumers (anyone who hasn’t done their groceries at Lidl or Aldi?).  Lastly, a service supplier who is a natural person, such as a movie director, could travel to another [...]

By |2025-05-07T15:58:32+01:007 May 2025|Blog, International Trade|0 Comments

A beginner’s guide to tariffs: Why are they harmful?

Trump is using tariffs as his main international economic policy tool and is providing two conflicting narratives on why he is using them. On the one hand, he suggests that raising tariffs is the key to making America wealthy again: the US government will supposedly raise trillions in tariff revenue, manufacturing production and jobs will move back to the US, and the US trade deficit will finally shrink. On the other hand, tariffs are an instrument to bring countries to the table and negotiate a deal.[1] Yet, of the two narratives, only one can stand. To bring back jobs and reduce the deficit, tariffs must be permanent. If they are a negotiating tool, they must be temporary. Leaving behind the motivations for the tariff increases, economists tend to disagree that raising tariffs will make America wealthier. Ever since the first round of tariffs on Canada and Mexico was announced, experts have warned about the negative consequences: prices for US consumers will increase, fewer products will be available, exports will fall, and economic activity (GDP) will contract. And this is just for the US. Since the US is a large market with the power to affect world demand and prices, the [...]

What’s wrong with the USTR analysis of worldwide protection?

The analysis by the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) that accompanies President Trump’s tariff announcement on 2 April is so profoundly wrong that one might (almost) feel sorry for the USTR staffers tasked with putting academic lipstick on a wayward pig. Their central argument is that one can measure how protectionist a country’s trade policies are by the size of its trade surplus in goods with the United States. Vietnam is judged to be highly protectionist because it exports to the USA much more than it imports. It is a relatively poor developing country with a competitive advantage in low-paying manufactures (such as clothing) which the US largely abandoned decades ago. It also has little appetite for the kinds of goods and services that the US exports. Vietnam’s trade with the US is not the result of protectionism. The EU, which retains a strong manufacturing sector in Germany, and has a significant surplus with the US, is judged to be more protectionist than the UK, whose competitive advantage is stronger in services. The reality is that despite Brexit, there is little difference between the trade policies of the UK and the EU. The USA runs a trade deficit [...]

By |2025-04-04T11:01:30+01:004 April 2025|Blog, International Trade|0 Comments

Trump’s steel and aluminium tariffs: A problem for some products

You will have read many columns in the past weeks on the wild and unstable tariff-hikes announced by the Trump 2.0 administration. Yet, only a fraction of these announcements was effectively implemented. Here we look at one of them, the steel and aluminium tariffs, and try to gauge their relevance for UK exporters. Let us start by recalling the core elements of the policy. On March 12th the US applied new and higher import tariffs on steel and aluminium products from all countries. These tariffs expand the existing “Section 232” tariff programme on steel and aluminium, first applied in 2018 by the Trump 1.0 administration, in three main ways: all existing exemptions and special arrangements were closed. After the application of Section 232 tariffs in 2018, several countries reached arrangements with the US to be fully or partly exempt from these taxes. The UK benefited from tariff-rate quotas on both steel and aluminium but this arrangement, together with those of several other countries (including, among others, the EU, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Australia) was now terminated. tariffs on aluminium products were increased from 10% to 25% tariffs were expanded to cover several products containing steel and aluminium, i.e. derivatives produced [...]

By , |2025-03-21T13:32:15+00:0021 March 2025|Blog, International Trade|0 Comments

The ‘new normal’: Can the UK and other democratic middle powers play a pivotal role?

We are now living in the ‘new normal’ where the US presence is absent in maintaining the international trade order. The US played a major role in building and maintaining the open and rules-based world trade order from the latter half of the 20th century to the first decade of the 21st century. During the first Trump administration (2017-2021), world trade was exposed to US protectionism involving unilateral tariffs, withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Biden administration (2021-2024) revised the US’ unilateralism by promoting international cooperation with its strategic allies in areas of US interest, such as G7 work on economic security and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Yet, its inward-looking approach remained basically the same as the previous Trump presidency. For example, President Biden retained most of the unilateral tariffs, especially those on Chinese imports, that were imposed during the Trump administration. The Inflation Reduction Act (20220) and CHIPS and Science Act (2022) prioritised domestic industry by providing subsidies and other financial incentives. The ‘new normal’: The absence of the US in the international trade order With Trump back as President of the US, we are [...]

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