In this Briefing Paper, Mattia Di Ubaldo and Anupama Sen examine the UK's position as an exporter to the US, compared to its main competitors, and identify over 500 products that could lead to export growth opportunities for the UK. Read Briefing Paper 85: HOW DOES THE UK STACK UP AGAINST OTHER EXPORTERS IN THE US MARKET?
HOW DOES THE UK STACK UP AGAINST OTHER EXPORTERS IN THE US MARKET? BRIEFING PAPER 85 - JUNE 2025 MATTIA DI UBALDO AND ANUPAMA SEN[1] Download Briefing Paper 85 KEY POINTS The UK’s trading position with the US is potentially more favourable than that of other major exporters like the EU, China, Japan, India, and South Korea. We carefully inspect data on trade between the US and its major partners, to assess the position of the UK as an exporter to the US from various angles. We compute an index of competitive pressure faced by the UK by third countries in the US, both on aggregate and in 2-digit HS chapters. We also inspect the competitors of the UK in the 50 products (at the 6-digit level) with the largest shares of UK exports to the US. The main competitor of the UK is the EU, both overall and in specific sectors and products. Other large countries exert pressure in specific sectors (e.g. China in plastics, articles of iron and steel, and electrical machinery). We also explore patterns of trade dependence between the UK and the US, and between the EU and the US. The UK is found to depend [...]
The current UK Government is focused on delivering economic growth and positioning the UK as an important economic and diplomatic player internationally. The relationship with the EU is probably the most crucial bit in this jigsaw, and the deal struck on Monday, outlined in a “Common Understanding”, indicates the direction of travel: cautiously and selectively rebuilding closer relations with the EU along a number of dimensions, first and foremost on security and defence matters, but also including energy, environmental, and some economic aspects. We will discuss three particular areas that are related to trade in the ‘common understanding’: fisheries and trade in agri-food products, youth mobility, and cooperation on energy markets and carbon emissions, respectively. We explain why the deal delivers in two out of three areas. More could have been done, and with firmer commitments. The document essentially represents a negotiating agenda with mostly aspirational language, whereby the two parties agree to “work towards” certain outcomes and everything has to be finally negotiated. Yet every journey starts with a single step, and the one taken on Monday is a sensible step in the right direction. Fish and food: Significant departures from Brexit A core, perhaps the main, EU demand [...]
The UK and the US announced the first bilateral post-Reciprocal Tariffs deal on 8 May, named the 'U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal' (henceforth the US-UK EPD). The document published yesterday draws out the contours of this EPD, alongside some concrete initial proposals for reciprocal preferential market access for selected goods. Notwithstanding the negotiations starting immediately, this arrangement can be called off at any time, simply by the two parties giving each other written notice. Besides its symbolic and diplomatic relevance, what is the value of this emerging deal for the UK? This is not a Free Trade Agreement. At first glance, it looks like a quid-pro-quo “mini-deal” of limited economic relevance that the US strong-armed the UK into accepting under the threat of tariffs. The UK is getting some respite from Trump’s tariffs in the (important) car and the (strategic) steel and aluminium sectors, in exchange for lowering tariffs on some agricultural products such as ethanol and beef, the latter on a reciprocal basis. But a closer reading of the ‘General Terms document’ suggests that it is more than this, and a lot worse. First, as stated on page 1 of the text, the arrangement that the US and the UK [...]
Trump is using tariffs as his main international economic policy tool and is providing two conflicting narratives on why he is using them. On the one hand, he suggests that raising tariffs is the key to making America wealthy again: the US government will supposedly raise trillions in tariff revenue, manufacturing production and jobs will move back to the US, and the US trade deficit will finally shrink. On the other hand, tariffs are an instrument to bring countries to the table and negotiate a deal.[1] Yet, of the two narratives, only one can stand. To bring back jobs and reduce the deficit, tariffs must be permanent. If they are a negotiating tool, they must be temporary. Leaving behind the motivations for the tariff increases, economists tend to disagree that raising tariffs will make America wealthier. Ever since the first round of tariffs on Canada and Mexico was announced, experts have warned about the negative consequences: prices for US consumers will increase, fewer products will be available, exports will fall, and economic activity (GDP) will contract. And this is just for the US. Since the US is a large market with the power to affect world demand and prices, the [...]
You will have read many columns in the past weeks on the wild and unstable tariff-hikes announced by the Trump 2.0 administration. Yet, only a fraction of these announcements was effectively implemented. Here we look at one of them, the steel and aluminium tariffs, and try to gauge their relevance for UK exporters. Let us start by recalling the core elements of the policy. On March 12th the US applied new and higher import tariffs on steel and aluminium products from all countries. These tariffs expand the existing “Section 232” tariff programme on steel and aluminium, first applied in 2018 by the Trump 1.0 administration, in three main ways: all existing exemptions and special arrangements were closed. After the application of Section 232 tariffs in 2018, several countries reached arrangements with the US to be fully or partly exempt from these taxes. The UK benefited from tariff-rate quotas on both steel and aluminium but this arrangement, together with those of several other countries (including, among others, the EU, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Australia) was now terminated. tariffs on aluminium products were increased from 10% to 25% tariffs were expanded to cover several products containing steel and aluminium, i.e. derivatives produced [...]
Download Briefing Paper 80 Briefing Paper 80 - May 2024 Ruby Acquah, Mattia Di Ubaldo, Michael Gasiorek Note: For further information on the values of the Regulatory Indices for 2021, please consult the data at the 2-digit HS level. Key points Introduction Product Regulations and Directives and their Impact on International Trade How the Indices are constructed from EU Regulations and Directives Descriptive Overview of the Regulatory Intensity Indices Conclusion Key points Post-Brexit, UK producers and distributors must show compliance with EU Regulations and Directives when exporting to the EU Single Market, which includes Northern Ireland. Fulfilling these obligations can create novel costs. The Windsor Framework creates a “dual market access” position for producers in Northern Ireland, as their exports are unaffected by the new border formalities and regulatory barriers faced by either GB or EU firms when serving each other’s markets. We introduce a set of indices at the 6-digit product level that capture three categories of obligations resulting from a core list the EU Single Market Regulations and Directives. The three categories are: Technical Requirements, Conformity Assessment, and Compliance These indices can help capture the incidence and impact of EU product regulation on GB-EU trade, trade [...]
In this Briefing Paper, Ruby Acquah, Mattia Di Ubaldo, Michael Gasiorek introduce a set of new indices that capture the regulatory obligations for products exported to the EU’s Single Market, and provide a background discussion of product regulations and directives and their impact on international trade. Read Briefing paper 80: REGULATORY INTENSITY AND THE EU SINGLE MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK.
13 December 2023 James Harrison is Professor in the School of Law at the University of Warwick. Emily Lydgate is Professor in Environmental Law at the University of Sussex and Deputy Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO). Ioannis Papadakis is a researcher at the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy (CITP) and a Research Fellow in Economics. Sunayana Sasmal currently serves as a Research Fellow in International Trade Law at the UKTPO. Mattia di Ubaldo is Fellow of the UKTPO and Research Fellow in Economics of European Trade Policies. L. Alan Winters is Founding Director of the UKTPO, Co-Director of the CITP and Professor of Economics at the University of Sussex. In answering this important question, different disciplinary approaches have emerged as have a range of different and sometimes contradictory findings. At the moment, scholars from the different disciplines are not talking to each other about the implications of this. The authors of this blog suggest it is vitally important that they begin to do so. Trade agreements around the world increasingly include environmental and labour provisions. Their presence attests to policymakers’ recognition that trade agreements cannot simply focus on economic issues. They should also address environmental and social [...]
Download Briefing Paper 74 Briefing Paper 74 – April 2023 Mattia Di Ubaldo, Guillermo Larbalestier and Manuel Tong Koecklin Key Points Introduction No more conditions, deeper preferences and less uncertainty Who will really benefit from the changes in the Enhanced DCTS access criteria? More favourable rules of origin for LDCs Conclusion Key Points Non-reciprocal trade preferences are a policy tool that can promote export-led growth in developing countries. In the UK, the current scheme – the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) – will be replaced by the Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS) in 2023. The new DCTS introduces minimal changes to the preferential tariff schedules across the three sub-schemes. Instead, there are changes in the eligibility criteria for countries to access the more preferential Enhanced Preferences sub-scheme; and changes in the rules of origin (RoOs) enabling use of the preferences under the Comprehensive Preferences sub-scheme offered to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Potential duty savings for countries moving from the GSP General Framework to the DCTS Enhanced Preferences are very small, as these countries do not trade much in products benefiting from GSP or DCTS preferences. However, the new system offers greater certainty which can contribute to growth and [...]
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