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So far L. Alan Winters has created 83 blog entries.

Briefing Paper 35 – BREXIT AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: ‘NO-DEAL’ IS STILL COSTLY

A great deal of attention has been devoted to the consequences of different forms of post-Brexit trade policy for UK exports. But focusing on the gross value of UK exports – e.g. the decline in exports of completed cars as the cost of exporting to the EU rises – is only part of the story because it misses the effects on the sectors and other countries that supply inputs into UK goods. In this Briefing Paper, the authors unpack value chains to identify which sectors and countries create the value that is embodied in UK flows of exports and imports, and hence to identify how the changes in trade induced by a ‘No deal’ Brexit will affect the value contributed (i.e. the incomes generated) by different sectors and countries. Studying only the effects of ‘No deal’ on the costs of conducting goods trade, but following them throughout the British economy, the authors find that ‘No deal’ could reduce UK GDP by 4% relative to remain. Moreover, because of the decline in incomes and the fact that services are key inputs into manufactured exports, the incomes generated in services sectors would also be around 4% smaller. Read Briefing Paper 35 – BREXIT AND [...]

BP 35 – Brexit and global value chains: ‘No-deal’ is still costly

Briefing Paper 35 – July 2019 Ilaria Fusacchia, Luca Salvatici and L Alan Winters Key Points Introduction Trade in value added The Baseline Modelling Brexit The effects of a ‘No deal’ Brexit Conclusion Footnotes Bibliography Online Appendix Key points The production of exports depends on value chains – between firms in one country and, through global value chains (GVCs), across international borders. Thus exports from one UK sector depend on value added from (and hence generate incomes in) other UK sectors and other countries. Trade policies and the costs of doing trade apply to the gross value of a trade flow (e.g. a tariff is levied on the whole value of an imported car). But focusing on gross value – e.g. the decline in exports of cars as the cost of exporting to the EU rises – may be misleading because it misses the effects on the sectors and other countries that supply inputs into UK cars. Even after the immediate logistical disruptions have been smoothed out, a ‘No deal’ Brexit will cut trade with the EU, and although trade with other countries, e.g. China, will increase, it will not do so by enough to make up the loss. Moreover, [...]

By , , |2025-12-12T10:51:22+00:001 August 2019|Comments Off on BP 35 – Brexit and global value chains: ‘No-deal’ is still costly

BP 34 – The Future of UK-US Trade: An Update

Briefing Paper 34 Download Briefing Paper 34 Peter Holmes, J. Brad Jensen, Emily Lydgate, Stephen Weymouth, Rorden Wilkinson, and L. Alan Winters Key points Introduction Brexit uncertainty The backstop and the issue of running two standards books Is a deal even possible? US negotiating guidelines What does USMCA foreshadow for a future US-UK trade agreement? What is the US’ likely strategic position on services? The changing market for US MNC foreign affiliate spending Conclusion Footnotes Key points Given the current political turmoil in the UK, a quick and economically significant outcome to US-UK trade negotiations seems unlikely. A great deal depends on the degree of alignment that the UK keeps with the EU on tariffs and regulations. Despite the current aggression towards the European Union, it is far from inevitable that the UK will cut its ties significantly. Aligning UK rules with those of the US, as per the US negotiating objectives, would create divergences with the EU and inevitably create extra frictions at the UK-EU border. The so-called Level Playing Field requirements, as set out in the backstop of the Withdrawal Agreement, constrain a potential UK-US agreement. The renegotiation of NAFTA into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement provides several insights [...]

By , , , , , |2025-12-17T15:59:25+00:0030 July 2019|Comments Off on BP 34 – The Future of UK-US Trade: An Update

‘No deal’ means ‘no deal’

03 July 2019 L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory. Last week I was challenged twice for using the term ‘no deal’. There is no such thing, I was told, because, even if the UK does not ratify the Withdrawal Agreement of 25th November 2018, there will still be plenty of deals. At the time I thought, for several reasons, that this was wrong in substance if not literally, but more recently I have concluded that it is also dangerous.  Like we saw in the referendum campaign, it undermines informed debate by deliberately confusing the terminology. ‘The deal’ is an agreement between the EU and the UK ‘setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union’ (Article 50 – Treaty on European Union). ‘No deal’ is the absence of such a deal. For business and the economy, ‘no deal’ has come to mean the absence of a trade agreement under which the UK and the EU trade with each other on terms better than those provided for under the World Trade Organization. The former ‘no deal’ implies the latter – as I argue below [...]

By |2025-07-18T11:21:53+01:003 July 2019|UK- EU|5 Comments

Briefing Paper 34 – THE FUTURE OF UK-US TRADE: AN UPDATE

Within days of Mr Johnson becoming Prime Minister, President Trump announced that talks about a “very substantial” trade deal with the UK are under way. In this joint Briefing Paper with colleagues from Georgetown University and UKTPO fellows, we consider the effects that Brexit uncertainty is likely to have on the capacity of the UK to agree a deal with the US and ask whether a deal is politically even possible in the UK.  We investigate key issues in negotiating a bilateral agreement: the backstop and the problems posed by the EU and US standards regimes. The paper also explores the prospects and pitfalls of the US Government guidelines for negotiations between the US and the UK; the US’s potential strategic position on services and the declining importance of the UK and Europe as traditional places of spending for US multinational corporations especially in the areas of information technology soft- and hardware. Overall we conclude that while the governments involved see obvious political attractions in a UK-US free trade agreement, a quick and economically significant conclusion to the talks seems unlikely. Read Briefing Paper 34 – THE FUTURE OF UK-US TRADE: AN UPDATE

Can BP 31 – The UK Do Better Than Just Rolling Over The Trade Agreement With Korea?

Download Briefing Paper 31 Briefing Paper 31 – June 2019 Authors: Julia Magntorn Garrett, Minako Morita-Jaeger and L. Alan Winters Key points Introduction An Evaluation of KOREU and KORUS GATS-PLUS achievements Comparing the extent of liberalisation by sector Comparing the degree of liberalisation by mode of supply Comparing regulatory cooperation Possible options for the UK and reality checks Conclusion Footnotes Online Appendix Key Points In the early months of 2019, the UK Government’s efforts to roll-over the EU’s existing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) were focused on the narrow issue of preparing for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit. But if the UK manages an orderly Brexit and has a transition period until the end of 2020, there would be time to do more than just rolling over these agreements. In the case of a future UK-Korea deal, the UK could potentially negotiate a new FTA built on the Korea-EU FTA (KorEU) or negotiate a completely new FTA modeled loosely on the Korea-US FTA (KORUS). Our comparative analysis of KorEU and KORUS reveals that the two FTAs took very different approaches to services trade liberalisation. While both achieved greater market access than Korea had committedin the GATS, KORUS seems to have achieved [...]

By , , |2025-12-12T11:03:25+00:0013 June 2019|Comments Off on Can BP 31 – The UK Do Better Than Just Rolling Over The Trade Agreement With Korea?

Briefing Paper 31 – CAN THE UK DO BETTER THAN JUST ROLLING OVER THE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH KOREA?

In the case that the UK manages an orderly Brexit and has a transition period until the end of 2020, rather than just rolling over the existing agreements, what would be the possible options for future Free Trade Agreements? In the case of a future UK-Korea deal, the UK could potentially negotiate a new FTA built on the Korea-EU FTA (KorEU) or negotiate a completely new FTA modelled on the Korea-US FTA (KORUS). Our comparative analysis of KorEU and KORUS in services reveals that the two agreements took very different approaches for services trade liberalisation. Both achieved “GATS-plus” liberalisation commitments from Korea. KORUS seems to have achieved slightly more than KorEU. However, KORUS is more complicated and less transparent than KorEU. It also contains more WTO-inconsistent features. The KORUS option would enable the UK to better pursue its own specific needs since it would not be directly bound by KorEU. On the other hand, the WTO-inconsistent aspects of KORUS would need to be avoided, based on a clear vision of UK’s contribution towards the future multilateral trading system. Either way, the UK would face two stumbling blocks: the UK’s lack of negotiating power and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses [...]

Indicative votes – the economics behind the options

3 April 2019 Dr Michael Gasiorek is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Sussex and a fellow of the UK Trade Policy Observatory. L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory. Understandably the politics surrounding the UK’s exit from the EU are dominating current discussions. But the economics of the options still matter, and it is not always evident how well the core economic issues are understood. In the light of the Government’s ‘approach’ to Labour to find a consensus and in the light of the indicative votes, the aim of this blog is to clearly outline the economic issues and summarise the likely consequences associated with two of the current (indicative) options. […]

By , |2025-07-18T11:48:10+01:003 April 2019|UK - Non EU, UK- EU|1 Comment

The UK’s Continuity Trade Agreements: Is the roll-over complete?

29 March 2019 Nicolo Tamberi is Research Assistant in Economics for the UK Trade Policy Observatory and L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory. The eight EU Trade Agreements that the UK has rolled-over replicate current trading conditions with their respective partners to a substantial extent. However, conditions could still deteriorate for at least two reasons: A bilateral negotiation that excludes the EU can only partially overcome possible problems with rules of origin; UK regulation and/or certification can be recognised only where partners have not tied themselves to EU regulations. Where they have, recognition of UK regulation and certification must wait until the UK also aligns with the EU. […]

By , |2025-07-18T11:49:36+01:0029 March 2019|UK - Non EU, UK- EU|3 Comments

What should we make of the UK’s ‘No Deal’ tariffs?

14 March 2019 Dr Michael Gasiorek is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Sussex and Julia Magntorn Garrett is a Research Officer in Economics at the University of Sussex. Both are fellows of the UK Trade Policy Observatory. L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory. Key points: Around 72% of UK’s MFN tariff lines will see reduced protection. The UK’s average MFN tariff is reduced significantly, from around 7.7% to 0.7%; however this does little to increase the share of duty-free imports. The UK’s MFN tariff proposal will reduce tariffs on many products imported from countries currently trading on WTO terms, but increase them on imports from the EU. Following the first defeat of the Withdrawal Bill in Parliament, and prior to yesterday’s vote on a ‘No Deal’ alternative, the Government published the temporary tariff schedule it proposes to apply in the event of a no deal. As with most things Brexit, this is complicated to unpick, especially as some of the listed items are simply asterisked, and the details on these need to be found in another (1400 page) document! […]

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