About L. Alan Winters

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So far L. Alan Winters has created 66 blog entries.

Three-way voting paradoxes

16 January 2019 L. Alan Winters CB, Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory This note supplements an article on ‘Organising a three-way referendum’ published on The Economist website (16th January 2019). It offers a worked example to show how the three main approaches to three-way ballots operate and some of the challenges they throw up. It reinforces Ken Arrow’s result that there is no ideal way of combining individual preferences to select one of three options. […]

By |2025-07-18T13:29:24+01:0014 January 2019|UK- EU|2 Comments

Organising the ‘Second’ Referendum

17 December 2018 L. Alan Winters CB, Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory. The UKTPO exists to provide independent and objective advice on the economics and law of Brexit and trade policy. The question of whether to hold a ‘second’ referendum is essentially a political one. However, how to organise such a referendum is a technical question on which economists have something to offer. […]

By |2025-07-18T13:29:51+01:0017 December 2018|UK- EU|23 Comments

The UK’s post-Brexit Trade Relationship with the European Union: Through a glass, darkly

10 December 2018 L. Alan Winters CB, Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory  The Brexit Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration are being presented as a means to end the uncertainty about the UK’s future relationship with Europe. But in an explainer for the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe, Professor L Alan Winters argues that this is not the case. Uncertainty will continue regardless of what happens to the Withdrawal Agreement. Briefly, he argues that, if the Withdrawal Agreement is approved by Parliament and the EU: The backstop it mandates requires a customs union between the UK and the EU and that most EU regulations for goods will apply in Northern Ireland. However, there is no regulatory alignment between the rest of the UK and the EU and so, if the backstop came into operation, there would be border formalities both in the Irish Sea and as UK goods entered the EU via any other route. Negotiating a trade agreement with the EU will take a lot longer than the 21 months allowed for it in the Withdrawal Agreement, not least because every EU member state has a veto over trade agreements. The Political Declaration [...]

By |2025-07-18T13:30:24+01:0010 December 2018|UK- EU|0 Comments

What should we make of the Government’s Brexit estimates?

30 November 2018 L. Alan Winters CB, Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory, Dr Michael Gasiorek, a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Sussex and Peter Holmes, Reader in  Economics at the University of Sussex both fellows of the UK Trade Policy Observatory. We welcome the Government’s estimates of the economic consequences of alternative Brexits. They are way overdue. The modelling was very competently done. But the assumptions made tended to favour the Government’s preferred position over other alternatives. On Tuesday, the UK Government released a set of cross-Departmental estimates of the possible economic costs of different Brexit options. They were based on the Government’s own modelling, which uses a technique known as a Computable General Equilibrium modelling and is based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) consortium’s world model and dataset. The aim is to model (very approximately) the important linkages in an economy over a medium to long-term horizon and to assess the possible impact of changes in trade policy on the economy. (Short-term modelling, over a five year period, was simultaneously released by the Bank of England, but we do not discuss it here). The modelling approach is relatively [...]

By , , |2025-07-18T13:36:57+01:0030 November 2018|UK - Non EU, UK- EU|0 Comments

Briefing Paper 26 – THE BREXIT BURDEN: A CONSTITUENCY LEVEL ANALYSIS FOR HAMPSHIRE AND SUSSEX

This study focuses on the economic shocks that a ‘no deal’ Brexit would entail across the constituencies of Hampshire and Sussex. We take estimates of the effects of a ‘no deal’ Brexit on output and employment in different sectors of the UK economy and using the composition of employment in each constituency, estimate how each constituency will be affected. The novel feature of our analysis is that we allow for commuting and so convert the Brexit shock from referring to workers in a constituency to referring to residents in the constituency. With the South East region the most heavily engaged in cross-border trade, after allowing for the fact that people often live and work in different places, we estimate that the shock to residents of Hampshire and Sussex could be equivalent to the loss of about 43,000 jobs. Given that Brexit decisions will ultimately be taken on the floor of the House of Commons, this Briefing Paper provides a base from which Hampshire and Sussex MPs can start to assess the impact of Brexit on their constituents. Read Briefing Paper 26 – THE BREXIT BURDEN: A CONSTITUENCY LEVEL ANALYSIS FOR HAMPSHIRE AND SUSSEX See also: Online Appendix and subsequent work repeating the exercise for the full list of 632 [...]

By , , |2024-11-20T13:23:46+00:004 November 2018|Briefing Papers|0 Comments

Briefing Paper 24 – THE UK’S FUTURE SERVICES TRADE DEALS WITH NON-EU COUNTRIES: A REALITY CHECK

The UK government has high expectations about future services trade deals with non-EU countries. Yet, in practice, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) typically only provide greater legal certainty about current applied policies rather than bringing about actual trade liberalization in services.This Briefing Paper looks at why it is so difficult to achieve actual liberalization in service negotiations and what FTAs, in practice, can offer. The authors argue that based on other countries’ experiences, the UK government will face several significant challenges and complexities in negotiating services FTAs with non-EU countries. To make progress on FTAs, the UK government will need to encourage many bodies across government. Read Briefing Paper 24 – THE UK’S FUTURE SERVICES TRADE DEALS WITH NON-EU COUNTRIES: A REALITY CHECK

By , |2024-11-20T13:24:43+00:001 November 2018|Briefing Papers|0 Comments

Would Canada-plus do the trick?

26 September 2018 L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory and Nicolo Tamberi is a Research Assistant in Economics for the Observatory The brusque dismissal of elements of Mrs May’s Chequers plan at the informal meeting in Salzburg last week has stimulated feverish attempts to revive the case for a deep and special UK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), under the title of a CETA-plus agreement. This effort received substantial reinforcement from the Institute for Economic Affairs’ paper of 24 September 2018. None of the discussion, however, has dealt seriously with the fact that an FTA will require the introduction of border formalities on UK-EU trade and that these will both violate the commitment to the absence of a border in Ireland and create serious congestion at those ports dealing with UK-EU flows, which will increase trading costs and cut trade with the EU. […]

By , |2025-07-18T13:41:19+01:0026 September 2018|UK- EU|4 Comments

Decoding the Facilitated Customs Arrangement

23 July 2018 L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory and Julia Magntorn is Research Officer in Economics at the UKTPO. There is much to digest in the White Paper on The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union and much to clarify. This blog is devoted entirely to trying to understand the Facilitated Customs Arrangement (FCA) that aims to deliver frictionless trade in goods between the UK and the EU after Brexit. The FCA matters because trade that is ‘as frictionless as possible’ with the EU is now accepted by nearly everyone as desirable and has been characterised by much of business as essential. It also matters in the short term, however, because it is the UK government’s offer to the EU on how to ensure that there is no border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Without a solution to this latter problem there will be no Withdrawal Agreement and no transition. […]

By , |2025-07-18T13:43:48+01:0023 July 2018|UK - Non EU|6 Comments

Weasel words in the Chequers Statement

9 July 2018 L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory. The (three page) Chequers Statement is a remarkable political sticking plaster. Coupled with some robust politics it appeared to have kept the Cabinet unified for a few more days, although now even that goal has been missed. This note is not about the politics, but about the technical aspects of the Statement which is replete with ambiguities and wishful thinking (or worse). The White Paper, if it arrives on time, may resolve some of these ambiguities, but that is far from clear, given the political imperatives that Mrs May feels must guide her actions. […]

By |2025-07-18T13:46:58+01:009 July 2018|UK- EU|4 Comments

What about the remaining 80 percent – services? The ‘Customs Union’ and ‘Unilateral Free Trade’ share the same flaw

05 July 2018 L. Alan Winters CB is Professor of Economics and Director of the Observatory. Two years in and the Cabinet is still squabbling over the UK’s trade relationship with Europe. Among the options most discussed, if not most likely to occur, are The Jersey option – arrangements to provide conditions equivalent to the customs union and the Single Market in goods; Mrs May’s ‘third way’ customs partnership – where the UK collects EU-level tariffs at the border and rebates them only if UK tariffs are lower and firms can prove that the goods did not leave the UK. Until the UK can convince the EU that the technology to do the latter will actually prevent the leakage of lower-taxed goods into the EU, this is effectively the ‘customs union’; and Unilateral free trade – ‘no deal’ followed by the immediate abolition of all UK tariffs. This blog does not assess the relative merits of these arrangements, but notes that they share a common flaw: they ignore 80 percent of the British economy! The more successful 80 percent, in fact – the services sectors, in which the UK has a manifest comparative advantage (see below). The advocates of these [...]

By |2025-07-18T13:48:03+01:006 July 2018|UK- EU|8 Comments
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