The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to international shipping. An average of 129 ships travelled through the Strait during February. This number dramatically dropped to 4 by the beginning of March. Despite positive signals from President Trump that a peaceful resolution to reopen this vital shipping route might be imminent, it is likely that the effects of disruption will last for several months even when the Strait reopens.

This blog argues that the disruption to international shipping has consequences for the UK beyond its impact on rising energy prices. The blockade also affects UK food security by disrupting fertiliser trade. One way to address such problems for the future is by incorporating more comprehensive export restrictions rules and sustainable food systems chapters into the UK’s new free trade agreements. The UK also has an opportunity to show global leadership by building a consensus among countries to limit the use of export restrictions during the current crisis. In doing so, it can ease the impacts on vulnerable people in least-developed countries.

The Gulf conflict restricts trade in fertilisers

Fertilisers are a key input into global food production. They renew essential nutrients in the soil, like nitrogen, phosphorus, calcium and potassium, which are lost from the soil when crops are harvested. These soil nutrients can be replenished using farm materials, like manure. However, mineral fertilisers (manufactured from naturally occurring raw materials, including natural gas and mined ores) boost soil fertility more efficiently. They also help maximise the volume of crops grown on the land (crop yield) and boost farm profitability. By-products from fertiliser production, like CO2, are also important to food production. For example, CO2 is critical to the slaughter of pigs. Without it, the meat processing industry would be severely affected.

On the supply side, the Gulf States contributed over 30% of global exports of fertilisers in 2024: Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain accounting for 34% of global trade in urea (a key nitrogen fertiliser), 18% in ammoniated phosphate, and 23% in ammonia. Sulphur is also a critical ingredient for all phosphate fertilisers. 50% of global sulphur trade came through the Straits of Hormuz prior to the conflict.

This volume of trade is in marked contrast to the current position: the International Fertilizer Association reports that over 18.5 million tons of urea flowed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2014, yet by April 2026, the WTO tracked only one fertiliser-related vessel sailing through the Strait. Production costs are also rising. For example, sulphur is currently trading at $850-$900 per tonne, in comparison to $150-$180 per tonne in 2025. In response to rising costs, some producers of phosphate fertilisers are reducing production.

On the demand side, China, India and the regions of Southern Asia are the largest global consumers of fertilisers. Together, they absorb most exports from the Middle East. In the event of further constraints on fertiliser supplies from the Gulf, these countries will switch demand to other sources, like Russia and Belarus.

But fertilisers from Belarus and Russia are already severely affected by the limited safe passage for ships sailing through the Black Sea. Fertiliser export quotas introduced by Russia in 2025, as a consequence of the on-going Russia-Ukraine conflict, affect this supply too. Russia is seemingly prioritising its own farmers’ need for fertiliser: it imposed a temporary ban on exports of ammonium nitrate in March this year, which will further limit fertiliser available for export from the country. This ban is scheduled to end on 31^st May 2026, but it is unclear whether it will be lifted by then.

Accessing Russian supplies may not be an option for some farm businesses. High tariffs on fertiliser imports from Russia and Belarus imposed by the EU in 2025 in response to the war in Ukraine may make Russian fertilisers too expensive for European businesses. These businesses must already factor in potential cost increases on imported fertilisers anyway, due to the introduction of CBAM.

Trade restrictions on fertiliser produced in Russia and Belarus force businesses in the EU, the United States and Canada to seek alternatives, like Egypt. Yet Egypt is suffering its own fertiliser production constraints as it relies on liquid natural gas (LNG) imports from Israel for its fertiliser production. Israel ceased LNG exports at the start of the United States-Israel-Iran conflict. Despite a drop in LNG supplies, Egyptian urea production remains unchanged. Reports indicate that the Egyptian government is trying to reduce domestic fertiliser demand, rather than reduce exports. This strategy aims to preserve foreign currency reserves and protect the economy against inflation.

The fertiliser market is now splitting between countries that can afford to buy fertilisers as the prices rise and those that cannot. Prior to the US-Israel-Iran conflict, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa imported approximately 80% of their fertiliser requirements from Russia, Ukraine, India and China, as well as the Gulf States. These farmers are now responding to higher fertiliser prices and supply constraints by reducing the amount of fertilisers they use. When crops are deprived of key nutrients found in fertilisers, crop yields reduce and some fail entirely. Poor yields reduce farmers’ profits and lead to a rise in food insecurity in the country. These adverse effects will disproportionately fall on Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asian countries, which are already vulnerable to the adverse effects of food poverty caused by climate change.

The UK imports nearly 100% of its nitrogen fertiliser requirements

The UK is not dependent directly on fertiliser imports from the Gulf, but the Agriculture Industries Confederation reports that the UK imports most of its nitrogen fertiliser requirements following the closure of the last major UK production facility in 2022. Over 45% of the UK’s nitrogen fertiliser now comes from outside the EU, mainly from Egypt.

There are no chronic global shortages of all fertilisers at present, but there are growing industry concerns that sulphur supplies are severely constrained. However, with over one third of global fertiliser supplies unable to enter the Strait of Hormuz, UK farmers must now compete with other countries, like China and India, for other diminishing and expensive sources of fertilisers.

The Agriculture Industries Confederation is already warning UK farmers to buy fertiliser immediately ahead of the Spring planting season, to avoid shortages and further global price spikes. As Lord Fuller warned in a House of Lords debate in March this year, a potential 25% increase in fertiliser prices will raise production costs for farmers, especially for crops like wheat. These rising production prices will inevitably lead to an increase in food price inflation.

Solving the UK fertiliser shortages through FTAs

One way to address the challenges of the UK dependency on imported fertilisers is through the UK’s free trade agreements (FTAs). First, by incorporating a specific chapter on sustainable food systems; and second, by adding in more comprehensive rules on exports restrictions.

A ‘sustainable food systems’ chapter in future UK FTAs

The concept, ‘food system,’ is intended to capture all the ways that humans grow, process, trade, store, sell, consume and waste food; how that food, food production, processing and trade affects our health and wellbeing, either through what we eat or through the workplace conditions we produce food in; how all these food-related activities affect the natural environment; and what the drivers, regulation, outcomes and feedback loops are in the system. Additionally, the food system approach demonstrates how all these diverse elements interact.

A food systems approach to fertilisers would show supply as one component of a more complex problem. For example, guaranteeing a domestic supply is important because fertilisers are critical for increased domestic yields of grains, fresh fruits and vegetables. Availability of these foods is also important because they should form part of a balanced diet which is good for human health. Yet fertiliser usage is not benign: excess use of some fertilisers leads to environmental damage from run-off from the fields into the rivers and increased greenhouse gas emissions. A country may decide to limit domestic fertiliser use to the minimum necessary to gain some benefits, such as more domestically produced fruits and vegetables, without harming the environment and seek to persuade its trading partners to do the same. A country may also encourage its trading partners to collaborate to achieve global consensus on limiting fertiliser usage in this way. Both these provisions will impact trade.

In its recent preferential trade agreements, like the EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement, the EU incorporated a chapter on Cooperation on Sustainable Food Systems (SFS), which is distinct from the SPS and TBT chapters elsewhere in the FTA.

The SFS chapter is not subject to formal dispute settlement provisions but does allow formal dialogue in a sub-committee of the main SPS Committee. This sub-committee is designed to bring policymakers together to discuss all the challenges around sustainability along the food supply chain. It also provides a forum for trading partners to discuss ways to reduce fertiliser use that causes environmental damage, and collaborate to encourage other countries to agree on global rules to do the same.

More detailed rules on export restrictions in UK FTAs

As the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz illustrates, the UK’s dependence on imported nitrogen fertiliser could affect the UK’s food security.

Whilst the current problems arise from conflict, the UK will be equally vulnerable to export restrictions imposed by countries on key foodstuffs (fresh fruits and vegetables) and inputs for food production (fertilisers and seeds) imported into the UK. Countries commonly resort to export restraints during times of actual or anticipated shortage, as policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate. As climate change starts to impact traditional sources of UK feed, foods and fertiliser, export restrictions may become more problematic for UK food security.

The WTO rules prohibit export restrictions in Article XI: GATT and Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture, but such measures can be temporarily applied to prevent “critical shortages” of foodstuffs and other essential products. Relying on WTO dispute settlement to determine the legality of export restrictions placed on fertilisers is problematic: the process is time consuming, and the dispute may not be resolved before the adverse impacts on UK food security start to be felt.

One solution is to incorporate rules on export restrictions and export duties that go beyond WTO commitments into the UK’s new FTAs. The UK could draw on other FTAs that already take this approach, like the 2003 Singapore-Australia FTA (SAFTA) and the 2014 Korea-Australia FTA (KAFTA).

For example, Article 2.6.2(1) of the KAFTA requires the trading partner imposing any export restriction to explicitly take into account the “foodstuffs, energy and mineral resources security” of the other country before imposing any measure and enter into consultations about the scope and impact of the measure, if this is requested.

The SAFTA goes further. Article 8 of SAFTA expands the WTO obligations by explicitly banning export price requirements (other than for countervailing or anti-dumping duties purposes). Article 11 bans any export duties on a specific list of products agreed by the two countries. In SAFTA, the products listed in Annex 1 include peat, iron ores and critical minerals, like nickel.

Conclusion

Since exiting the EU, the UK takes between 2 and 4 years to negotiate a new trade agreement, so addressing fertiliser supply problems through an FTA is not a short-term panacea. Such an approach only works when the trading partner is a key exporter of those products and, more importantly, if they agree.

However, it does focus negotiators’ attention on where the UK is vulnerable to global supply chain disruption and enables them to try to put in place mechanisms to deal with those issues proactively. Without this protection, businesses must source fertilisers in an increasingly competitive global market with rising prices. These costs may be passed on to the consumer, further increasing the cost of living in the UK.

The UK has a chance to show global leadership by bringing countries together to reach an agreement on how to respond to the fertiliser supply constraints and rising prices. Discussions could centre around agreed limits on the use of export restrictions by major exporters, as well as a moratorium on export restrictions for fertilisers destined for least-developed countries. Countries importing fertilisers could agree to reduce import tariffs (to the extent that tariffs are not already set at zero) for the duration of the current supply constraints. Alan Winters and Simon Evenett suggested a similar response to address the medical supply constraints and country responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Implementing this solution would demonstrate the UK’s growing confidence as a ‘middle power’ and serve as an important initiative as the UK prepares to host the G20 in 2027.

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