The UK and EU announced in May 2025 that they would start negotiations to bring aspects of UK food and energy regulation back to EU-alignment. After a period of silence on the UK side, some details are now starting to filter out. Among these, recent headlines report that the UK will introduce legislation later this year to bring this about, likely as part of the King’s Speech in May.

While the detail remains unknown, these reports suggest that the UK will use secondary legislation to keep up with new EU rules in relevant areas (otherwise known as ‘dynamic alignment’). Keir Starmer has defended using this light-touch approach to Parliamentary scrutiny where necessary to further the national interest.

This blog argues that it will weaken the durability and legitimacy of closer EU relations. A more sustainable path would be to provide mechanisms for consultation and scrutiny, ensuring that EU alignment is not simply at the whim of ministers.

Entrenching the post-Brexit executive consolidation of power

Brexit proponents have long argued that following Brussels is undemocratic. However, even though Brexit formally restored the UK’s parliamentary sovereignty, what happened next was a reduction in UK Parliamentary scrutiny and a concentration of executive power. This happened largely through what the Public Law Project described as a ‘tsunami’ of secondary legislation, often in the form of statutory instruments. These are made by Ministers rather than Parliament, cannot be amended, are generally not debated, and are approved by a Joint Committee in a process that is semi-automatic. In fact, the House of Commons has not rejected a Statutory Instrument since 1979.

When in opposition, Starmer vehemently opposed the Conservatives’ use of Henry VIII clauses, a type of secondary legislation, accusing them of ‘silencing Parliament and handing sweeping powers to government ministers’. The Spectator has rightly picked up on this and the hypocrisy of Labour’s current stance.

A proper reset of Brexit is a 2-level game. First, it requires the UK Government to make good on its promise about ‘taking back control’ of UK laws, addressing the post-Brexit entrenchment of executive power. Second, it requires realigning legislation with the EU. However, aren’t these goals in contradiction to each other? Yes and no.

Yes, in the sense that the UK will follow the EU in some legislative areas. No, in the sense that the UK could do so in such a way as to provide more scope for checks and balances than is currently the case.

Future-proofing the EU-UK relationship

The democratic will of the people and EU alignment are not inherently in opposition. But entrenching a Minister-led approach to EU dynamic alignment reinforces the ‘rule-taking’ concerns that catalysed the Brexit vote. This is made plain by the reaction of shadow business secretary Andrew Griffith, who said that ‘Parliament reduced to a spectator while Brussels sets the terms is exactly what the country rejected’.

Now is a relatively benign moment in the public’s views on the EU. Polling suggests the majority view Brexit as a wrong decision and recent actions by the US have cast the EU as a model of reliability. Starmer’s government has a large majority. Pre-emptively positioning EU alignment as something decided by ministers, with little or no democratic mandate, sets the stage for the erosion of this support and provides fuel for an ongoing series of negative headlines about individual dynamic alignment decisions, relitigating Brexit ad infinitum.

Other models exist for dynamic alignment, including in the UK

Whether to dynamically align with a particular piece of EU legislation is a choice that presents a trade-off: market access versus regulatory autonomy. If there is strong public sentiment that a specific piece of EU legislation is not in the UK’s public interest, this should be reflected in the UK’s choice.

How is this choice to be made? It is not self-evident that it is by Ministers via secondary legislation. If dynamic alignment happens pursuant to the SPS Common Area, the Common Understanding between the UK and EU, which set the stage for the current negotiations, states that the UK can decide to align dynamically according to its domestic ‘constitutional and Parliamentary procedures’. This gives the UK some flexibility.

In a past blog, I set out several models for dynamic alignment with the EU, which vary greatly in the degree and way in which Parliament, devolved nations and other affected stakeholders are consulted.

In Switzerland, if the public feels strongly enough about not wanting to dynamically align with EU legislation, they can even petition for a referendum. The UK doesn’t have the same system for direct public votes as Switzerland. Introducing it would be the surest way to head off criticism. But even if such radical reform is a bridge too far, it is important to enable domestic processes that support and inform the UK government’s decision.

A decision to dynamically align should require explicit consent from the devolved nations. It should also require consultation of affected stakeholders. Alongside direct consultation, Parliamentary scrutiny could take place through House of Commons and House of Lords Select sub-Committees, which conduct ad hoc inquiries on major EU legislative developments in order to support evidence-gathering about the impact on the UK public, and the government could directly undertake stakeholder consultation as well. The UK could establish a Parliamentary committee with more scope for substantive scrutiny than the current UK Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.

Rethinking the domestic governance of the EU reset would provide Keir Starmer with a new, and more media-friendly, set of talking points. It would enable him to clearly differentiate our post-Brexit EU relationship from our pre-Brexit one. Creating more democratic legitimacy and public support for the governance of EU realignment will provide a necessary (if not sufficient) condition to future-proof it when the next Government arrives and begins to take stock of its extensive post-Brexit powers.

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