From 26 March to the early hours of 30 March 2026, ministers from WTO Members met in Yaoundé, Cameroon, for the 14^th WTO Ministerial Conference. The goal was to review the past two years of negotiations and deliver outcomes on the MC14 agenda. Coined the Reform Ministerial, most discussions focused on the WTO’s future amidst existing challenges and opportunities. And because it was held in an African country, the MC14 strongly emphasised development-related issues.

However, the current geopolitical context affected expectations for MC14, resulting in broad and vague ministerial documents and declarations. WTO negotiations depend on what WTO Members can agree on by consensus. Conflicting interests and diverging interpretations of even cornerstone rules, such as the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, made significant progress difficult.

MC 14 outcomes

MC14 outcomes were reached in advance and only formalised in Yaoundé. WTO Members agreed to continue negotiating fisheries subsidies, with a goal to achieve a comprehensive Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS2) during MC15. Since AFS1 entered into force on 15 September 2025, Members have until September 2029 to adopt AFS2. Failure to do so will result in the current agreement being terminated (unless the General Council decides otherwise).

Ministers also adopted two decisions on development issues. The first addresses the integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system, while the second concerns the use of special and differential treatments in the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

WTO Members could not reach a “Yaoundé package”. Instead, the draft texts produced during MC14 will serve as the basis for continued discussions in Geneva, with the aim of finalising agreements by the next General Council meeting, in May 2026. Topics include WTO reform and work plan, e-commerce, moratorium on TRIPS non-violation and situation complaints, and least developed countries (LDCs). Notably, there is no mention of agriculture, as Members failed, once again, to find a solution to the longstanding public stockholding issue.

A significant point of tension at MC14, which prevented progress in WTO reform discussions, was the clash between Brazil and the US over the future of the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions. The US pushed for its permanent extension, based on digital trade growth and legal certainty claims. Brazil, however, favoured a two-year renewal, citing concerns about foregone tariff revenue, regulatory sovereignty, and the development of its domestic digital economy. The country argues that the moratorium disproportionately benefits big technology companies in the US and the EU. The lack of consensus led to the moratorium lapsing, creating legal uncertainty for digital trade and raising the risk of fragmented approaches. This could increase trade frictions and complicate efforts to negotiate multilateral rules regarding the digital economy.

Joint Initiatives: is the glass half full or half empty?

The most celebrated outcome was the adoption, by 66 WTO Members, of a pathway to implement the E-Commerce Agreement via interim arrangements, while efforts continue to incorporate it into the WTO rulebook. This means that these Members will not wait for consensus to integrate the E-commerce Agreement as an Annex 4 WTO plurilateral agreement. Instead, they will trigger domestic procedures to bring it into force.

This decision reflects the challenges of integrating new rules into the WTO legal framework. It also highlights the importance of negotiating within the WTO rather than in other forums, such as FTAs, which many developing countries and LDCs may not have the access or leverage to influence. Multilateral discussions remain the most inclusive avenue for addressing pressing transnational issues.

This move also shows that the WTO can offer more than formal processes and formal legal outcomes. It provides enough flexibility for Members to find creative regulatory solutions. However, questions remain on how the E-commerce Agreement can receive support from the WTO Secretariat or benefit from the WTO dispute settlement system.

The adoption of the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA) as an Annex 4 plurilateral agreement was once again blocked due to the consensus rule. This time, however, only one Member (India) opposed the decision, despite 129 Members having already accepted the IFDA. India’s position reflects a principled stance against adopting new rules outside the Doha Round mandate. Yet this position is increasingly isolating the country and undermining its self-portrayal as a defender of developing countries.

WTO reform

Although WTO reform is not a new topic, Members’ renewed efforts began to take shape during the 2024 retreat on ‘WTO Decision Making & Way Forward’. Norwegian Ambassador Ølberg was appointed as facilitator on WTO Reform in 2025 and led consultations with WTO Members ahead of MC14. The discussions resulted in a draft ministerial statement and a post-MC14 work plan. As mentioned, these documents will now steer the debate in Geneva, leading to the next General Council meeting. The discussions are organised around three broad themes: decision-making, development, and level playing field issues.

Many of the challenges in these talks stem from Members’ differing views on what the WTO is for and what it can and should do. Facilitator reports reveal a wide array of issues, suggesting that Members remain unable to narrow the scope of discussions. Several Members, including the UK, US, EU, China, Paraguay, and LDCs, as well as African and ACP groups, have submitted reform proposals addressing a multitude of topics and possible solutions. The US and EU position papers raise questions about the nature and application of the MFN principle. By framing MFN as flexible or conditional, these proposals risk normalising departures from one of the WTO’s core non-discrimination rules. This discourse legitimises selective rule application and undermines the trust and compromise required to advance WTO reform.

Rather than a catch-all term for any change in the WTO, ‘reform’ should be reserved for proposals that require amendments to the WTO Agreement, that is, decisions by consensus to modify existing WTO rules. Although a fine line separates changing WTO rules from introducing new ones, many of the issues currently discussed concern lawmaking (negotiating new rules or improving rules on matters under the WTO remit) and deliberations (not regulated by the WTO Agreement but developed through Members’ practices). Grouping them under the same label increases disagreements and the use of vetoes.

Issues around strengthening the WTO functions and dynamics that work relatively well should be discussed in the relevant WTO body. This would address specific needs and procedures. Likewise, lawmaking is not a matter of reform but of Members agreeing on common goals. No change in process will make Members converge on the WTO’s purpose. MC14 showed that the most powerful WTO Members (developed and emerging economies alike) are seeking to preserve their policy space while restricting others’. They want to use trade tools to their benefit while preventing other Members from relying on instruments and resources not available to them.

What lies between law and politics: WTO governance

Amid claims that the WTO needs ‘less law and more politics’ or that none of its functions work, the conclusion of MC14 suggests otherwise. Talks will continue in Geneva, as Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala referred to ‘a new WTO way of working’. WTO governance emerges as the main pathway for the WTO to move forward.

Governance highlights the routine work in Geneva, where Members engage in regular meetings across WTO bodies and in informal consultations. This work is valuable because it allows Members to exchange information, improve transparency, develop trade knowledge, promote technical cooperation, and build trust.

International law has always struggled to balance the need for concrete, binding rules with the exercise of regulatory authority aimed at shaping behaviour and fostering change. The current geopolitical scenario has only intensified this inherent contradiction. WTO governance moves across law and politics through processes, structures, rules, and practices that guide decision-making and implementation.

The present and future of the WTO

When writing about MC13 two years ago, I argued that the future of the WTO hinged on flexibility and its day-to-day work in Geneva. Those reflections still apply. As geopolitical tensions intensify and the foundations of the WTO are increasingly questioned by those who designed them, Members must remain engaged in Geneva. They must demonstrate the political will to advance trade rules and cooperation, regardless of their format.

Developing countries and emerging economies should be at the forefront of this effort. They are the main beneficiaries of a multilateral forum where they can influence outcomes and build shared trade knowledge. Otherwise, they risk yielding to coercive pressure and entering one-sided deals that keep them at the margins. As heterogeneous as this group may be, they must find compromises to preserve the WTO in the long run. Supporting positions solely based on narrow national interests will only exclude them from the global trade debate already dominated by the rivalry between the US and China and the rise of the so-called “middle powers”. This label is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, given the economic scale and institutional capacity that many of these countries hold.

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