Post-Brexit, the UK will offer preferential market access to developing countries under a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). To allow developing countries to export to the UK after it leaves the EU on the same terms as the present, the UK Government’s plan is to replicate the GSP of the EU. This paper shows that simply rolling over the EU’s GSP, in particular, the rules for preferences removal (graduation), will determine changes in market access due to the uneven distribution of developing countries’ trade between the UK and the EU27 bloc. The country most affected would be India, which would lose trade preferences in the UK on a volume of trade worth approximately € 1.27 billion per year. Adjustments to the GSPs of both the UK and the EU, necessary to avoid the loss of trade preferences, are also discussed. Read Briefing Paper 32 – A POST-BREXIT GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES FOR THE UK: HOW TO GUARANTEE UNCHANGED MARKET ACCESS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

In the case that the UK manages an orderly Brexit and has a transition period until the end of 2020, rather than just rolling over the existing agreements, what would be the possible options for future Free Trade Agreements? In the case of a future UK-Korea deal, the UK could potentially negotiate a new FTA built on the Korea-EU FTA (KorEU) or negotiate a completely new FTA modelled on the Korea-US FTA (KORUS). Our comparative analysis of KorEU and KORUS in services reveals that the two agreements took very different approaches for services trade liberalisation. Both achieved “GATS-plus” liberalisation commitments from Korea. KORUS seems to have achieved slightly more than KorEU. However, KORUS is more complicated and less transparent than KorEU. It also contains more WTO-inconsistent features. The KORUS option would enable the UK to better pursue its own specific needs since it would not be directly bound by KorEU. On the other hand, the WTO-inconsistent aspects of KORUS would need to be avoided, based on a clear vision of UK’s contribution towards the future multilateral trading system. Either way, the UK would face two stumbling blocks: the UK’s lack of negotiating power and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses [...]